SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
Norton Schwartz and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Air-Sea Battle will help their Services organize, train, and equip to maintain operational access in sophisticated antiaccess/area-denial environments. 4 Other proponents note that this concept will be of particular importance in the western Pacific
Ocean, where China is building its own antiaccess/areadenial capabilities in an effort to deny the U.S. entry in its near-seas. 5 While intentionally vague, the Pentagon's statements about Air-Sea Battle lead analysts to conclude that the concept contemplates attacks that penetrate
Chinese airspace to eliminate key elements of the Chinese antiaccess/area-denial networks. Unfortunately, rather than exploring potential strategies in the event of conflict with China, the discussion has focused on the operational aspects of Air-Sea Battle outside any strategic context. What strategy might work in a war with China, however unlikely, is not being publicly discussed. Many media reports have confused the issue by suggesting that Air-Sea Battle is the strategy. Fortunately, the Pentagon's own Joint Operational Access Concept states that "It is important to note that AirSea Battle is a limited operational concept that focuses on the development of integrated air and naval forces in the context of antiaccess/area-denial threats." 6 In fact, Air-Sea Battle is the antithesis of strategy.
It focuses on the tactical employment of weapons systems with no theory of victory or concept linking the Air-Sea approach to favorable conflict resolution. To be fair, the absence of a stated strategy made it impossible for the drafters of the Air-Sea Battle concept to express
Because it is a nation that relies on maritime trade to sustain its economic growth, China is at a disadvantage because the geography of the "first island chain" restricts its access to the region.
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 278 3 how they could support such a strategy. In the absence of such a strategy, it is impossible to determine if investment in Air-Sea Battle logically advances or retards America's strategic goals-or whether alternative approaches might be both more effective and more suitable.
While a major conflict is unlikely, and, of course, undesirable, the Nation requires a military strategy for a conflict with China for two reasons. First, an essential element of military planning is to consider all possible options-even ones with remote possibilities of occurring. Second, strategy should drive the force structure and supporting procurement plan that support the particular conflict. If we are going to structure a significant segment of the Armed Forces for a possible conflict with China, we need to develop a corresponding military strategy first.
Outline for a Strategy
There are a number of useful models to guide strategists. Professor Eliot Cohen stated that a strategy should include critical assumptions, ends-waysmeans coherence, priorities, sequencing, and a theory of victory. Without listing, examining, and challenging assumptions, it is not possible to understand a strategy. 7 With assumptions identified, coherence in endsways-means becomes possible. These elements should not be treated separately. If goals are selected that exceed available means, we do not have a strategy. Priorities are required because a nation will not have the resources to do everything at once. Sequencing flows from priorities. Finally, a strategy must have a theory of victory-an answer to the question "how does this end?" It must express how the strategy achieves war termination on favorable terms. Looming budget cuts require that the United States also consider a strategy for the Asia-Pacific that significantly reduces the cost of maintaining U.S. influence in the region. The challenge is to achieve peacetime savings while leaving the United States well-postured in the region, and to defend its interests in the event of war.
Requirements for a Strategy
It is essential also to understand that there is no "good" strategy for a conflict between the United States and China. As has been the case when the United States confronted other nuclear powers, the strategist is forced to look for a "least bad" strategy. Sequencing would follow priorities. However, it
A Proposed Strategy
should be noted that due to the different forces required for each of the steps, further study might find that multiple steps could be initiated simultaneously.
Of particular importance is the peacetime prepa- 
Potential Chinese Responses
In evaluating any strategy, we must consider a Global sea-denial campaign. While China currently lacks the resources to conduct a sea-control campaign outside the range of shore-based air support, it could attempt a sea-denial campaign using a combination of submarines and surface raiders (armed merchant ships).
Surface raiders have been used repeatedly in history and, while a nuisance, have never been particularly effective.
In contrast, Chinese submarines would be a challenge.
However, as noted, a number of factors favor allied forces in an antisubmarine campaign. 
Advantages of Offshore Control
No strategy for fighting China can promise a good outcome. We are simply seeking to achieve our strategic goals while minimizing the damage incurred in such a conflict. 
Increases Deterrence and Assurance

Plays to U.S. Strengths. Offshore Control does not
focus on the few systems necessary to destroy China's antiaccess/area-denial systems and achieve sea control inside the first island chain. Instead, it is built on U.S. superiority in submarines and, with proper investment, sea mines to achieve sea denial inside the first island chain. It then adds highly capable U.S. ground-and sea-based air/ missile defense to the battle for air superiority over key battlespaces above allied nations. It also moves the allied antisubmarine campaign to the restricted gaps in the first island chain and outside the first island chain, where U.S.
air assets could participate in the antisubmarine warfare effort. Finally, it allows U.S. ground forces to contribute to the fight by intercepting and controlling major commercial ships. By mid-decade, roughly 869 new ships will make up over one-third of the global merchant fleet capacity when delivery is complete. 16 While the total cargo capacity is growing steadily, the total number of ships is decreasing as older container ships that hold 5,000
TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit) or less are being replaced by ships holding up to 18,000 TEU. 17 Clearly, the U.S. Navy has insufficient ships to control the almost 1,500 very large commercial ships projected to be in use by 2015. However, these numbers can be controlled by U.S. amphibious shipping projecting Army and Marine boarding parties that will travel with the ships to ensure they do not enter the maritime exclusion zone. Commercial shipping and helicopters could be contracted to support the distant efforts, thus reducing the stress on the amphibious fleet. 
Minimizes Economic
Taiwan-China Conflict?
The This approach requires major forces continuously deployed well forward in theater. It is difficult to see Congress approving large expenditures to provide a limited capability to respond to this low probability contingency.
It also requires a change of policy to allow U.S. forces both to train with the Taiwanese and to be based in Tai- wan. And, of course, it would require going down the escalatory path of Air-Sea Battle.
Critical Continuing Research
The fiscal situation resulting from a Sino-Ameri- 
